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We document an empirical relationship between the cross-country adoption of technologies and the
degree of long-term historical relatedness between human populations. Historical relatedness is measured
using genetic distance, a measure of the time since two populations’ last common ancestors. We find
that the measure of human relatedness that is relevant to explain international technology diffusion
is genetic distance relative to the world technological frontier (“relative frontier distance”). This evidence
is consistent with long-term historical relatedness acting as a barrier to technology adoption: societies
that are more distant from the technological frontier tend to face higher imitation costs. The results
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wacziarg@ucla.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Diﬀerences in technology adoption lie at the heart of diﬀerences in long-term economic performance
and standards of living across societies. Total factor productivity (TFP), an indirect measure of
technology based on the Solow residual, accounts for a vast share of diﬀerences in income per capita
across countries (e.g. Caselli, 2005 and Hsieh and Klenow, 2010). Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2008)
have provided evidence of large lags in the usage of speciﬁc technologies, implying that technology
usage disparities might account for a large part of cross-country TFP diﬀerentials. Technological
innovation has also played a paramount role in the study of economic growth and development, both
theoretically and empirically (e.g., see Aghion and Howitt, 2008). In this literature, the question of
why the adoption of new productivity-enhancing technologies takes place so slowly and unequally
across diﬀerent societies remains a central puzzle.
In this paper, our goal is to shed light on the barriers and obstacles that prevent or delay
the adoption of speciﬁc technologies across countries. We focus in particular on human barriers,
holding ﬁxed geographic barriers. We formulate and test the hypothesis that rates of technology
adoption depend on measures of long-term historical relatedness between populations, i.e. on their
degree of kinship. The main idea of this paper is twofold: (1) on average, populations that are
more closely related tend to be more similar with respect to traits (habits, customs, beliefs, values,
etc.) that are transmitted with variation from one generation to the next, and (2) similarity in
intergenerationally transmitted traits tends to reduce the barriers to technology adoption - i.e.,
populations that share more similar intergenerationally-transmitted traits face lower costs when
imitating each other’s innovations.
We argue that long-term genealogical distance works as a barrier to the diﬀusion of innovations
across populations. It is important to emphasize that we are not assuming that populations would
necessarily inherit traits that make them directly more productive. In fact, in our theoretical
framework, inherited traits have no direct eﬀect on a population’s productivity. What matters,
in our model, is that random historical divergence introduces diﬀerent customs, habits and norms
across populations, and that these diﬀerences, on average, tend to decrease their ability to learn
from each other. Even relatively trivial diﬀerences in attitudes, appearance or behavior between
groups may lead to misunderstanding or discrimination, and may create signiﬁcant barriers to
communication and social interactions, reducing opportunities for learning and imitation.1 In sum,
1Indeed, the microeconomic literature on the diﬀusion of innovations (Rogers, 1995) is consistent with a central
1our central hypothesis is that diﬀerences in technology adoption across societies can be explained
by barrier eﬀects inversely related to the degree of relatedness between human populations.
Building on our previous work on the diﬀusion of economic development (Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2009), we capture historical relatedness between populations using genetic distance. Genetic dis-
tance is calculated as a summary measure of the diﬀerence in allele frequencies across a set number
of genes, or loci. As human populations split from each other over the course of history, they de-
veloped distinct genetic markers from random mutations. Most of these genetic mutations did not
confer any environmental advantages and diﬀused as the simple result of randomness (they were
not selected), so they are called neutral genes (Kimura, 1968). Genes used to compute common
measures of genetic distance are chosen from among neutral genes. For such genes, random muta-
tions arise and diﬀuse at a constant rate, so measures of genetic distance based on a large enough
number of neutral genes reﬂect the time separating two populations from a common ancestor, as in
a molecular clock. We argue that human traits that create barriers between populations on average
diverge to an extent proportional to the separation time between two populations.
Thus, genetic distance is an ideal measure of the degree of historical relatedness between pop-
ulations. An intuitive analogue is the concept of relatedness between individuals: two siblings are
more closely related than two cousins because they share more recent common ancestors - their
parents rather than their grandparents. Our key hypothesis is that technological innovations are
more likely to be adopted across siblings than across more distant cousins: separation times between
populations are associated with similarity in a wide range of traits, transmitted either genetically or
culturally from parents to children, that matter for the ease of adoption of productive innovations.
Figure 1 (from Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza, 1994, p. 78) is a phylogenetic tree illustrating
how diﬀerent human populations have split apart over time. Such phylogenetic trees, constructed
from genetic distance data, are the population analogs of family trees for individuals.
It must be emphasized that genetic distance is based on neutral change, and, therefore, is not
meant to capture diﬀerences in speciﬁc traits that may directly matter for ﬁtness and survival.
Genetic distance is a general measure of long-term relatedness, and is associated with the whole
set of traits that are transmitted "vertically" from parents to children, biologically and culturally.
It is therefore a general metric for the average diﬀerence in traits passed on across generations over
the very long run - that is, over the time horizon along which populations have split apart. In
role for subjective barriers between groups and populations.
2this paper we call "vertical traits" all characteristics that are passed on intergenerationally with
variation within a population over the very long run.
This paper is the ﬁrst to empirically document the eﬀects of genealogical relatedness on the
adoption of speciﬁc technologies across countries. To do so, we use historical and contemporary
data on usage rates of a wide range of technologies, dating back to the year 1500. We use two
recently developed databases of technology adoption: The Cross-Country Historical Adoption of
Technology (CHAT) dataset, which covers a wide range of detailed technologies going back to the
year 1800 (Comin and Hobijn, 2009), and the database of historical technology adoption used in
Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010) to study technological persistence since antiquity (this database
goes back to 1000 BC, but we only make use of data since 1500 AD). We compare the empirical
eﬀects of the bilateral genetic distance between populations to that of genetic distance relative to
the technological frontier, ﬁnding that the latter trumps the former as a determinant of bilateral
diﬀerences in technological adoption rates. This empirical test is consistent with a barrier eﬀect
of long-term historical distance, whereby societies that are more distant from the technological
frontier tend to face higher imitation costs. We ﬁnd large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of
relative frontier distance on technology use diﬀerences. These large eﬀects at the level of individual
technologies can help explain current diﬀerences in total factor productivity and income per capita
across countries.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a stylized model of the diﬀusion of
technologies as function of diﬀerences in vertically transmitted traits across human populations,
and ultimately as a function of the degree of genealogical relatedness between them. Section 3
presents our data and empirical methodology. Section 4 describes the empirical results, and Section
5 concludes.
2 A Theory of Relatedness and Technology Adoption
In this section we present a simple framework linking long-term relatedness (measured by genetic
distance), intergenerationally transmitted traits, and the adoption of technologies across popula-
tions. The main ideas are that (1) genetic distance measures the degree of long-term genealogical
relatedness of diﬀerent populations over time, (2) on average, populations that are more closely
related tend to be more similar with respect to traits that are transmitted with variation from
one generation to the next, (3) similarity in intergenerationally transmitted traits tends to re-
3duce the barriers to technology adoption: populations that share more similar intergenerationally-
transmitted traits face lower costs when imitating each other’s innovations. These hypotheses have
testable empirical predictions: intensive and extensive margins of technology adoption should be a
function of diﬀerent populations’ genetic distance relative to the technological frontier, rather than
the bilateral distance between them. The empirical section then tests this prediction.
2.1 Genetic Distance and Vertically Transmitted Traits
As discussed earlier, genetic distance measures the diﬀerence in allele distributions between two
populations, where the chromosomal loci under consideration are neutral - that is, they change
randomly and independently of selection pressure. When two populations split apart, random
genetic mutations result in genetic diﬀerentiation over time. The longer the separation time, the
greater the genetic distance computed from a set of neutral genes. Therefore, genetic distance
captures the time since two populations have shared common ancestors - i.e., the time since they
have been the same population. Overall, genetic distance is a general metric for average diﬀerences
in traits passed on across generations over the very long run - that is, over the time horizon along
which populations have split apart. We call "vertical traits" all those traits that are passed from
one generation to the next within a population, with variation, over the very long run.
These concepts can be illustrated with a simple analytical example. For simplicity, let all
vertical traits of a population be summarized as a point on the real line. At time 0 ("the present")
population  has vertical traits (0),w h e r e(0) is a real number. In general, populations inherit
their vertical traits from their ancestor populations with variation. Speciﬁcally, population  living
at time 0, and descending from ancestral population  living at time −, will have traits given by:
(0) = ()(−)+(−0) (1)
where ()(−) are ancestral population ()’s vertical traits at time −,a n d(−0) measures
random variation between time − and time 0.
Consider the simplest possible mechanism for variation: vertical change as a random walk,
whereas (−0) = 0 with probability 12 and (−0) = −0 with probability 12.
In addition, consistently with a "neutral" view of intergenerational change, we assume that such
shocks are independent across diﬀerent populations - i.e., shock (−0) is independent of shock
(−0) for  6= . By the same token, at time − population ()’s vertical traits are inherited
4from its ancestor population (()), living at time −0  − , according to the following equation:
()(−)=(())(−0)+()(−0−) (2)
where ()(−0−)=0  0 with probability 12 and ()(−0−)=−0  0 with probability
12. Again, shocks are independent across populations.
Now, consider three populations ( =1 23). Population 1 and population 2 descend from
the same last common ancestor population (1) = (2) ≡ (1&2) living at time −. In contrast,
population 3 only shares common ancestors with populations 1 and 2 going back to time −0
: (3) 6= (1&2),a n d((3)) = ((1&2)) ≡ (1&2&3). The phylogenetic tree of the three
populations is illustrated in Figure 2.
By construction, genetic distance (12) between population 1 and population 2 is smaller than
genetic distance between population 1 and population 3 (and smaller than genetic distance between
population 2 and population 3). Formally:
(12) =  (13) = (23) = 0 (3)
Vertical traits in each population are given by the following equations:
1(0) = (1&2)(−)+1(−0) (4)
2(0) = (1&2)(−)+2(−0) (5)
3(0) = (3)(−)+3(−0) (6)
(1&2)(−)=(1&2&3)(−0)+(1&2)(−0−) (7)
(3)(−)=(1&2&3)(−0)+(3)(−0−) (8)
Let () ≡ | − | denote the distance in vertical traits between population  and population
. The expected vertical distance between population 1 and population 2, which share their last
common ancestors at time −,i s : 2
[(12)] =  (9)
2The derivation is straightforward. With probability 14 both populations experience a positive shock ,a n dw i t h
probability 14 both populations experience a negative shock - Hence, with probability 12, their vertical distance is
zero. With probability 12 one population experiences a positive shock  and the other a negative shock −,i m p l y i n g




22 =  .
5Clearly, all variation between populations 1 and 2 is given by change that took place between time
− and 0. In contrast, expected distance between population 1 and population 3 (and between
population 2 and population 3)w i l lr e ﬂect shocks that took place both between time −0 and −
and between time − and time 0. On average, such shocks bring about a larger expected distance:3
[(13)] = [(23)] = max{
0
2
+  0 +

2
} = [(12)] (10)
Thus, larger genetic distance, on average, is associated with larger distance in vertical traits. Of
course, this relation is not deterministic. Some pairs of populations that are genealogically more
distant may end up with more similar vertical traits than two more closely related populations, but
that outcome is less likely to be observed than the opposite outcome. On average, genetic distance
and vertical distance go hand in hand.
2.2 Relative Vertical Distance from the Frontier and Technology Adoption
Over the millennia, populations have diverged in a series of traits transmitted vertically from parents
to children. These vertical traits include physical and cultural characteristics. Most of these traits
have diverged randomly, and do not need to have a direct eﬀect on survival and ﬁtness. However,
this divergence has led to diﬀerences across populations. Our key hypothesis is that such diﬀerences
may act as barriers to the diﬀusion of technological innovations across populations in modern times.
It is reasonable to expect that, on average, populations that share a more recent common history and
are therefore closer in terms of intergenerationally transmitted traits, face lower costs and obstacles
3The derivation is as follows. With probability 14 population 1’s ancestor populations and population 2’s ancestor
populations experienced identical shocks both between time -T’ and time -T and between time -T and time 0. That is,
with probability 14 we have (1&2)(−−
0)=(3)(−−
0) and 1(0−)=3(0−), implying (13) = 0
B yt h es a m et o k e n ,w i t hp r o b a b i l i t y14 the two populations experienced identical shocks between time −
0 and −
but diﬀerent shocks between time − and time 0, implying (13) = 2, and with probability 14 identical shocks
between − and 0 but diﬀerent between −
0 and −, implying (13) = 2
0 With probability 18, one population
linaeage has experienced two positive shocks (
0 + ) while the other has experienced two negative shocks (−
0 − ),
therefore leading to a vertical distance equal to 2
0 +2  Finally, with probability 18 one population lineage has
experienced a positive shock 
0 and a negative shock − while the other population lineage has experienced -
0 and
 In this latest case, the vertical distance (13) = |2 − 2
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The same expected vertical distance holds between populations 2 and 3.
6to adopting each other’s innovations. The literature on the diﬀusion of innovations (Rogers, 1995)
is consistent with a major role for subjective barriers between groups and populations. As Rogers
points out, summarizing the lessons from decades of research, most people depend upon a subjective
evaluation of an innovation that is conveyed to them from other individuals like themselves who have
previously adopted the innovation. Overall, historical relatedness and similarity is likely to reduce
imitation costs, while a higher vertical distance should be associated with higher imitation and
adoption costs. In sum, our main hypothesis is that long-term divergence in vertically transmitted
traits act as a barrier to more recent "horizontal" diﬀusion of innovations across societies.
2.2.1 Extensive margin
These ideas can be formalized very simply in a one-period model. At time 0, one of our three
populations - say, population 1 - introduces a continuum of innovations of mass .4 An innovation
 ∈ [0] will be adopted by population  =2 3 if and only if the innovation’s beneﬁts  are higher
than its costs .5 Our key hypothesis is that adoption costs for each population are a function of
vertical distance from the frontier (population 1):
 =  + () (11)
where   0 and 0 Diﬀerent innovations come with diﬀerent costs and beneﬁts. To ﬁxi d e a ,
assume that the ratio ( −) is distributed uniformly between 0 and 0 with innovation 0
having the highest ratio (0−0) =  and innovation  having the lowest ratio (−) =0 







Population  will adopt ∗
 innovations, where, for each adopted innovations  ∈ [0∗
 ],  ≥ .
Hence, the marginal ∗
 is deﬁned by:
∗
 = ∗
 + () (13)
4We assume here, for simplicity, that the probability of coming up with an innovation is independent of vertical
traits. If vertical traits also explain the onset of innovations, the eﬀects under consideration would be larger. These
direct eﬀects are not necessary for our results.
5We abstract from an eﬀect of vertical traits on the beneﬁts from adoption. Again, such eﬀect would strengthen
the relationship, but is not necessary for the results.
















This equation shows that the number of innovations adopted by each population is decreasing in
its vertical distance from the frontier. If vertical traits change according to the simple random-walk
process illustrated in the previous subsection, the expected rate of adoption for population 2 (which
is genetically closer to the frontier population 1: (12) = ) will be larger than the expected rate
of adoption for population 3 (which is genetically more distant from the frontier (13) = 0 ):7
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Let () ≡ |∗
 −∗
 | denote the diﬀerence in rates of technology adoption (extensive margins)
between population  and population . Our basic framework implies that such diﬀerence will
depend on relative vertical distance from the frontier, and hence, on average, on relative genetic






|() − ()| (17)
Therefore, we predict a positive correlation between diﬀerences in rates of technology adoption
() between two populations  and ,a n dt h e i rrelative frontier distance,d e ﬁned as |() −
()|.
This framework can also account for a positive correlation between diﬀerences in rates of tech-
nology adoption () and bilateral genetic distance (),a sl o n ga s|() − ()| and
() are positively correlated (as they indeed are in the data). However, our theory also im-
plies that relative frontier distance is a better predictor of technology adoption, because it is a
more accurate measure of relative distance from the frontier in terms of vertical traits. For ex-
ample, if one were to use bilateral genetic distance as a proxy for expected vertical diﬀerences,
on average one should expect that diﬀerences in rates of technology adoption between popu-
lation 2 and population 3 ought to be identical to diﬀerences in technology adoption between
6The equation holds for () ≤  For ()  , 
∗
 =0(no innovation has positive net beneﬁts).
7In what follows we assume, without loss of generality, that  ≥ 
0.












), which would hold if and only if {∗
2} = 
But, as we have seen above, on average population 2 does not adopt all innovations, because it faces
barriers associated with its own vertical distance from the frontier: |∗




using bilateral genetic distance (23) as a measure of barriers to technology adoption between
population 2 and population 3 would lead us to overestimate the adoption gap between population
2 and population 3 (or, equivalently, to underestimate the adoption gap between population 1 and
population 3). In general, our theory predicts that bilateral genetic distance is a biased proxy
for the fundamental determinant of comparative adoption of innovations across societies. This
fundamental determinant is the relative distance in vertical traits, which can be measured more
accurately by relative frontier distance,a sd e ﬁned above.8 We test the prediction that relative
frontier distance should trump bilateral genetic distance as a determinant of technology adoption
in the empirical section.
2.2.2 Intensive margin
An analogous illustration of the main idea can be provided with respect to intensive margins of
adoption. This is important because much of our technology data focuses on the intensive margin.
Let  denote the level at which a given innovation  is used by population . Assume that beneﬁts
and costs of adoption are now given as follows:












Again, the diﬀerence in adoption rates (this time at the intensive margin) will be a function of







|() − ()| (21)
8For further discussion of the relation between relative frontier distance and bilateral genetic disatance, see Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2009, p. 477).
9The above results illustrate our hypothesis that technology adoption is a function of relative distance
in intergenerationally transmitted traits. As we have already discussed, such relative distance
between populations can be captured empirically by their relative genetic distance from the frontier.
2.3 A Dynamic Example
In the rest of this section we illustrate our general ideas in a dynamic framework, that will allow
to establish a more explicit and microfounded link between the adoption of innovations, imitation
costs, distance in vertical traits, and total factor productivity. Changes in vertical traits tend to
take place much more slowly and at a longer horizon than the spread of technological innovations,
especially if we focus on modern technological progress and growth in a post-Malthusian world.
Therefore, in this simple dynamic example we assume for simplicity that populations do not change
over time (their size is ﬁxed and normalized to one), and that their inherited vertical traits do not
change over the relevant time horizon (additional small random shocks to vertical traits would not
aﬀect the basic results, while they would greatly complicate the algebra). Hence, consider our three
populations  =1 23, with vertical traits 1, 2 and 3, inherited from their ancestral populations
as described above, and unchanged in modern times (i.e., for  ≥ 0) Time is continuous. At each





under a standard budget constraint, where () is consumption, and 0 is the subjective





= () −  (23)
where () is the real interest rate in society  ( w ea s s u m et h a tt h et h r e es o c i e t i e sa r en o tﬁnancially
integrated). At time ,i ne a c hs o c i e t y, there is a continuum of intermediate goods, measured on
the interval [0 ()] Each intermediate good is produced by a local monopolist. In each society 




[()] 0 1 (24)
where () is the quantity of intermediate good of type  employed at time  in economy .
We assume that society  is at the technological frontier, which means that (0)  (0) for
all  6=  Innovation at the frontier economy takes place endogenously, as in Romer (1990) and
10related literature. In particular, as in Barro and Sala—i-Martin (1997 and 2003, chapters 6 and 8),
we assume that the inventor of intermediate good  retains perpetual monopoly power over the
production of that input in society , and henceforth sells it at price  =1 , earning the proﬁt
ﬂow  =( 1− )(1+)(1−) at each time .9 The cost of inventing a new intermediate good at
the frontier is  units of ﬁnal output. Free entry into the innovation sector implies that the real
interest rate () must be equal to .W e a s s u m e   , which implies that consumption





Consequently, output () and the frontier level of intermediate goods () will also grow at the
rate .
The other societies cannot use the intermediate goods invented in economy  directly, but, as
in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), must pay an imitation cost  in order to adapt the interme-
diate goods to local conditions. Our key assumption is that such imitation costs are increasing in
the distance in vertical traits between the imitator and the frontier.S p e c i ﬁcally, we assume that







The above speciﬁcation is consistent with our main hypothesis: diﬀerences in vertical traits act as
barriers to adoption and imitation. The parameter  captures the extent to which dissimilarity in
vertical characteristics increases imitation costs. For a given distance in vertical characteristics, an
imitator in society  faces lower imitation costs when there is a larger set of intermediate goods
available for imitation (that is, when ()() is low). The rationale for this assumption is
that the intermediate goods that are easier to imitate are copied ﬁrst. The parameter 0
captures this advantage from technological backwardness. Whether imitators whose technology
is farther from the technological frontier face lower or higher imitation costs is debated in the
empirical literature (for a recent survey, see Fagerberg, 2004). Our perspective suggests that, when
assessing the relationship between imitation costs and technological backwardness empirically, one
should control for distance in long-term vertical traits. As we will see, in steady state societies
that are farther technologically (and hence should face lower imitation costs for this reason) are
also farther in terms of vertical distance from the frontier (and hence should face higher imitation
costs through this channel). Failure to account for this vertical distance from the frontier may
9For a detailed derivation see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997 and 2003)
11lead to overestimate the imitation costs directly associated with a given technology gap - that
is, to underestimate the advantages directly associated with technological backwardness (a lower
()() in our framework).
Again, we assume that an imitator who pays cost () to imitate good  has perpetual monopoly
power over the production of that input in economy , and hence can charge  =1  earning the
proﬁt ﬂow  =( 1− )(1+)(1−), while output is proportional to available intermediate goods
() in equilibrium:
()=2(1−)() (27)
As shown in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997, 2003), with free entry into the "imitation" sector,










In steady state, the level of imitation costs ∗
 is constant, while the number of intermediate goods
in economy , as well as output and consumption, all grow at the same rate as in economy  -t h a t
is, at rate  =










for all  and , which implies the following relationship in steady state:
|ln∗
() − ln∗
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|() − ()| (30)
The intuition of the above equation is straightforward: long-term diﬀerences in total factor pro-
ductivity and output between societies are an increasing function of their relative cost to imitate,
which depends on their relative vertical distance from the frontier.10 Therefore, this dynamic model
conﬁrms the key implications of the simpliﬁed static setup presented above.
In sum, our framework predicts a positive correlation between diﬀerent adoption rates of innova-
tions (at both the extensive and intensive margins, and as measured by total factor productivity) be-
tween society  and society , and their relative vertical distance from the frontier |()−()|.
Since vertical distance is on average higher among societies that are genetically more distant, the
framework predicts that, on average, diﬀerences in the rates of adoption of innovations and total
factor productivity will be correlated with relative frontier distance.
10Interestingly, the eﬀect of relative frontier distance is decreasing in parameter , which measures the beneﬁts
(lower imitation costs) associated with technological backwardness
122.4 Possible Extensions and Discussion
We have illustrated our main hypotheses in a highly simpliﬁed setting. Our approach is consistent
with modeling barriers to technology adoption (in the sense of Parente and Prescott, 1994 and
2002) as a function of vertical distance from the frontier. This general idea could be formalized in
more complex frameworks. For example, a possible extension would be to embed these eﬀects in
models of technology diﬀusion and growth, such as Comin and Hobijn (2010), where, in order to
become the sole supplier of a particular capital vintage, the capital good producer must bear an
up-front ﬁxed cost (an adoption cost). Our hypothesis is that such costs are aﬀected by barriers
that vary across societies as a function of their relative vertical distance from the technological
frontier. Speciﬁcally, our hypothesis is consistent with an extension of Comin and Hobjin (2010)’s
model where the parameter  in their equation (17) varies across economies as a function of their
relative vertical distance from the technological frontier. Our theoretical approach could also be
extended to consider not only the eﬀects of long-term barriers on outcomes in steady state, but
also transitional eﬀects, which may play an important role in the onset and diﬀusion of modern
economic growth.11
Our model involves assumptions that could be relaxed in future work. We assume for instance
a monotonic relationship between technology and TFP, ruling out the possibility of "appropriate
technologies". Instead it may well be that certain technologies raise TFP more in some countries
than others, depending on various country characteristics such as capital-labor ratios, climate,
literacy, etc. This could be relevant, in the empirical section, when we consider technologies that are
partial substitutes for each other, such as tractors and harvest machinery. The adoption of each of
these may be more or less beneﬁcial to a country’s overall TFP depending on, for instance, climatic
conditions. Our model also does not allow for technological leapfrogging. For instance, the adoption
of cell phones might be more rapid in a country that lacks existing land line infrastructure. In our
empirical work, such a leapfrogging eﬀect would serve to reduce the magnitude of the estimated
eﬀect of genetic distance on diﬀerences in technology adoption.12 I nt h es a m ev e i n ,c o u n t r i e sc o u l d
learn, not from the innovator, but from an already advanced imitator. For instance, China might
11For example, an analysis of the relation bewteen barrier eﬀects and transitional income diﬀerences is provided
by Ngai (2004).
12In fact, when it comes to cell phones, we ﬁnd little evidence of systematic leapfrogging - see Section 4.5. Genetic
closeness to the US strongly predicts the extent of cell phone adoption despite the possibility of leapfrogging.
13have more to learn from Korea or Japan than directly from the US. In our empirical work, this would
again serve to weaken the relationship between technological diﬀerences and genetic distance, so a
richer model that would incorporate such learning patterns would not invalidate the basic ﬁndings
of this paper. Such extensions are left for further research. The bottom line of this section, more
simply, is to illustrate the basic idea that relative frontier distance acts as a barrier to the adoption
of technological innovations across societies - a hypothesis that we test empirically in the rest of
this paper.
3D a t a a n d M e t h o d o l o g y
3.1 Genetic Distance
To measure long-term relatedness between human population, we use genetic distance. In doing so,
we follow a recent strand of research documenting strong correlations between genetic distance and
a variety of political and economic outcomes, such as per capita income (Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2009) and bilateral conﬂict between nations (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009).
The original data on genetic distance is from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), who gathered a
comprehensive dataset of allele frequencies for a large number of world populations. In this paper,
we focus on their World matrix, providing allele frequency data for 120 gene loci covering 42 world
populations. As a measure of heterozygosity, we focus on  genetic distance, a functional form
to map diﬀerences in allele frequencies into a single distance metric that has been shown to have
desirable properties (in particular, if populations are of a suﬃcient size,  genetic distance has
been shown to be perfectly correlated with the time separating two populations’ common ancestors).
Figure 1 (from Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi and Piazza, 1994, p. 78) is a phylogenetic tree illustrating
how diﬀerent human populations have split apart over time. As we already discussed, phylogenetic
trees, which are built from genetic distance data, are the population analogs of family trees for
individuals. In our data, the largest observed genetic distance is between Mbuti Pygmies and
Papua New Guineans ( =0 4573), while the smallest distance is between the Danish and the
English ( =0 0021).
Genetic groups were matched to current ethnic groups using data on the ethnic composition of
countries from Alesina et al. (2003). Genetic groups were further matched to countries. We did so
for two points in time: We ﬁrst created a match for 1500, using the ethnic composition of countries
14as they were in the period preceding the discovery of the New World (in this match, for instance,
the US is matched to the North Amerindian genetic group). In the 1500 match, each country is
matched to a single genetic group. Next, we matched ethnic groups to the current populations of
countries on the basis of the frequency data of ethnic groups by country also provided in Alesina et
al. (2003). Ethnically diverse countries were matched to several of the 42 genetic groups, allowing
the computation of diﬀerent measures of genetic distance between countries (for instance, in this
contemporary match, the US is matched to a combination of English, Asian, West African and
North Amerindian). Further details on these matches of genetic groups to ethnic groups and on to
countries can be found in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). For the contemporary period, we focus
on a weighted measure, capturing the expected genetic distance between two randomly selected
individuals, one from each country.13 Formally, assume that country 1 is made up of populations
 =1  and country 2 is made up of populations  =1 .D e n o t eb y1 the share of population
 in country 1 (similarly for country 2)a n d the  genetic distance between populations  and







(1 × 2 × ) (31)
where  is the share of group  in country ,  is the  genetic distance between groups  and
. Using this method, the average weighted bilateral genetic distance between two countries in our
sample, across 10585 country pairs, is 0113,with a standard deviation of 0082 (Table 1).
While 
12 is the bilateral genetic distance between countries 1 and 2, we can denote by

12 the genetic distance between 1 and 2 relative to the technological frontier. We refer to
the latter, throughout this paper, as bilateral frontier distance. Then, for instance if the frontier




bilateral genetic distance and relative frontier distance are the direct empirical counterparts of the
theoretical concepts deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 .
3.2 Technological Adoption
We employ two datasets to capture historical and current technological adoption levels. The ﬁrst
dataset, from Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010), (henceforth CEG) describes the level of technology
13Using instead the genetic distance between genetic groups constituting a plurality of the populations of each
country did not materially aﬀect the results. The two measures only diﬀer for pairs involving countries made up of
more than one genetic group, so in practice the two measures are highly correlated.
15adoption for a wide panel of countries at years 1000 BC, 1 AD, 1000 AD, 1500 AD and 2000 AD. In
our empirical work, we only make use of data for the latter two dates, since we only observe genetic
distance data for 1500 and the contemporary period. For 1500, the CEG data captures exclusively
the extensive margin of technology adoption. They characterize whether each of 113 contemporary
countries were using any of 24 technologies as of 1500. These technologies, listed in Appendix
1, are grouped into 5 categories: military technologies, agricultural technologies, transportation,
communication, and industry. For each of the underlying technologies in each category, a country
is given a score of 1 is the underlying technology was used in 1500, and zero otherwise.14 The scores
are then summed within each category, and divided by the maximum obtainable score, resulting in
a value between 0 and 1. Additionally an overall index of technological sophistication is obtained
by averaging the scores over all 5 categories (thus, each technological category is given equal weight
in the overall technological sophistication score). In our empirical work we make use of both the
categorical scores and the overall index.
For the contemporary period (1970-2000), the CEG dataset is constructed using a diﬀerent
approach. Since the extensive margin diﬀuses very fast in the current period (for instance, it is very
easy for a country, however technologically unsophisticated, to import and use a single computer),
the measures include the intensive margin. Using the per capita usage intensity of 9 underlying
technologies at various recent dates, CEG compute an overall index of technological adoption, based
on Comin, Hobijn and Rovito (2008). The functional form for the current technological adoption
index captures the usage lag from the technological frontier (i.e. the United States): it is based
on where a country stands in terms of technology usage in terms of the number of years since
the United States had the same usage intensity. The index is normalized to vary between 0 and
1. Again, the index is broken down into underlying sectoral components that mirror 4 of those
for 1500 (all but the military technology category). Table 1 provides summary statistics for the
contemporary technology use index, as well as its sectoral subcomponents.
The second dataset we use is the CHAT dataset, from Comin and Hobijn (2009). This allows
a much more detailed investigation into the adoption of speciﬁc technologies without aggregating
them into any sort of index. We focus on the 1990-1999 time period, and among the over 100
technologies we retain those for which at least 50 countries are available, to ensure suﬃcient sample
14For agricultural technologies, the scoring is a bit diﬀerent, with a score of zero assigned to hunter-gatherer
countries, 1 for pastoralist countries, 2 for hand cultivation, and 3 for plough cultivation.
16size and variability. We average the the usage data over the 1990-1999 period, and divide each
measure by the country’s population, following Comin, Easterly and Gong (2010).15 The resulting
set of 33 technologies we explored from the CHAT dataset are listed in Appendix 1 - they cover a
wide range of technological categories such as agricultural technologies, transportation technologies,
communications technologies, medical technologies, and industrial technologies.
In addition to speciﬁc technologies, we also use data on per capita income from the Penn World
Tables version 6.3, for the year 2005, to both replicate the baseline results in Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009) and to explore, as a ﬁrst step, the determinants of diﬀerences in aggregate TFP (for which
per capita income is a good proxy). Our model delivers predictions not only concerning the intensive
and extensive margins of speciﬁc technologies, but also the resulting determinants of diﬀerences in
aggregate TFP, and we brieﬂy examine those at the beginning of our empirical investigation.
3.3 Methodology
To test the predictions of our model, we adopt a bilateral approach which consists of calculating a
measure of the diﬀerence in technology usage intensity across all available pairs of countries in our
sample, and regressing it on characteristics of the pair, chieﬂy genetic distance. While in principle
we could simply regress a country’s technological use level on its genetic distance to the frontier
country, the bilateral approach has the advantage of allowing for a horserace between bilateral and
relative frontier distance.16 Such a horserace is a central test of our barriers model, since under
such a model, relative frontier distance should come out stronger than bilateral distance. Moreover,
we can make more eﬃcient use of a wealth of bilateral distance data as control variables - chieﬂy
geographic data.
Denoting () the countries in a pair, our baseline speciﬁcation is:
| − | = 0 + 1
 + 0
2 +  (32)
and (to conduct a horserace):
| − | = 0 + 1
 + 2
 + 0
3 +  (33)
15We prefer to use a consistent approach to determine the denominator of our technology usage intensity measures
rather than varying the denominator from measure to measure. In only one case (the share of cropland area planted
with modern variety) do we depart, since it would make little sense to divide this share by population.
16We have also completed a set of simple cross-sectional regressions, and these are available upon request. The
results were very consistent with those obtained under our more involved bilateral approach.
17where  is a measure of technology use by country ,  is a set of measures of geographic distance,
and  and  are disturbance terms. In all the regressions we present below, we control for a
wide range of metrics of geographic barriers captured by . It is essential to do so, as geographic
barriers compete with genealogical barriers as a candidate explanation for technological diﬀusion.
Moreover, geographic distance is correlated with genetic distance, since human populations that
live further apart are likely to have split up from each other earlier in human (pre)history. The
geographic barriers we introduce as controls include geodesic distance, latitudinal and longitudinal
distance, and a set of dummy variables for contiguity, whether one of the countries in a pair is
an island, whether one of the countries in the pair is landlocked, and whether the pair shares a
common sea or ocean.17
The speciﬁcations in equations (32) and (33) are reduced forms. Diﬀerences in technology usage
are presumably the result of diﬀerences in institutions, technologies, human capital, savings rates,
etc., all of which are possibly endogenous with respect to technology diﬀerences, and themselves a
function of geographic and human barriers. Our regressions are really an attempt to describe the
human and geographic barriers to the diﬀusion of innovations, without (for now) asking how the
eﬀects of these human and geographic barriers might be mediated by speciﬁc mechanisms - through
human capital, institutions, or otherwise.
Before turning to the results, we must address a technical point regarding the disturbances 
and . In principle, if one is willing to assume that the measures of barriers are exogenous (as
we do), equations (32) and (33) can be estimated using least squares. However, in this case usual
methods of inference will be problematic due to spatial correlation resulting from the construction
of the dependent variable, as an absolute diﬀerence of two countries’ technology levels. To address
the problem of spatial correlation, we rely on two-way clustering of the standard errors, following
the approach in Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006). In our application, clustering arises at the
l e v e lo fc o u n t r y a n da tt h el e v e lo fc o u n t r y, and is non-nested: each individual observation on
income diﬀerences, say | − | belongs to the group that includes country  and the group that
includes country . The estimator in Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006) allows for an arbitrary
correlation between errors that belong to "the same group (along either dimension)" (p. 7). Their
method is therefore directly applicable to the speciﬁc econometric issue we face (on page 3 of their
17We also included a wider set of controls, including freight costs, with similar results. In our dataset, freight costs
were so highly correlated with geodesic distance that it makes litle sense to include them both. See Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2009) for further details on this point and on the broader issue of geographic controls.
18manuscript the authors speciﬁcally mention spatial correlation as a possible application of their




Table 1 presents summary statistics for the main variables in our analysis, i.e. major technology
usage lags from the CEG dataset, per capita income, and our two main measures of genetic distance
- bilateral and relative to the USA. For the sake of space we do not present summary statistics for
the historical CEG data and for the disaggregated series from the CHAT dataset, but these are
available upon request and tell a similar substantive story.
Panel A presents means and measures of spread to aid in the interpretation of the magnitudes
of our estimated eﬀects. More substantively, Panel B presents simple correlations. Several observa-
tions are in order. Firstly, the various technology usage lag diﬀerences as well as bilateral diﬀerences
in per capita income bear moderate correlations with each other, generally in the range of 04 to
06. This is instructive as it indicates that our technology usage measures do not all capture the
same concept of diﬀerences in technological advancement, and actually measure diﬀerent (albeit
correlated) degrees of technological sophistication depending on the sector.18 Secondly, these mea-
sures of pairwise diﬀerences in technology adoption (plus per capita income, our proxy for aggregate
TFP) bear sizable positive correlations with relative frontier distance- in the range of 01 to 03
- consistent with the main hypothesis derived from our model. Thirdly, the correlations between
pairwise diﬀerences in technology adoption levels and bilateral genetic distance is much closer to
zero, and even sometimes negative. Thus, the evidence from simple correlations is consistent with
our barriers story: relative frontier distance seems to matter more than bilateral genetic distance.
4.2 Aggregate TFP
Table 2 displays empirical results from regressions as speciﬁed in equations (32) and (33), where
 is deﬁned variously as PPP per capita income as of 2005, PPP per capita income in 1870 or
18The correlations of the sectoral indices with the overall index of technological diﬀerences of which they are part
are greater - around 07−08 - this is not surprising as the overall index is constructed as the average of the sectoral
indices.
19population density as of 1500. The goal of these regressions is to capture the eﬀect of long term
barriers on aggregate TFP. The regressions build on those in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), but
here we explicitly include a horserace between bilateral and relative frontier distance. The ﬁrst three
columns enter relative frontier distance, bilateral genetic distance and both variables together in a
regression where the absolute diﬀerence in per capita income for 2005 is the dependent variable.
We see exactly the pattern implied by the model of Section 2: Entered separately, the magnitude
of the eﬀect of relative frontier distance, as measured by the standardized beta coeﬃcient, is three
times as large as the magnitude of the eﬀect of bilateral genetic distance (both estimates being
signiﬁcantly positive). A standard deviation diﬀerence in relative frontier distance can account for
30% of a standard deviation in absolute income diﬀerences, a substantial portion of the variation,
compared to only 10% for bilateral genetic distance. When both metrics of genetic distance are
entered together, relative frontier distance is large and signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient on bilateral
genetic distance is indistinguishable from zero.
Genetic distance, this time relative to the English population rather than the United States,
is also a strong predictor of technology diﬀerences in 1870, right after the onset of the Industrial
Revolution, and in 1500 as well (we follow the literature in using population density as a proxy for
technology in the pre-industrial, Malthusian era). For 1500, we use historical genetic distance as of
1500 as a regressor, so the regression captures the eﬀect of initial genetic distance on technological
diﬀerences prior to the discovery of the New World and the (possibly) endogenous population
movements that resulted from it. Northwestern Europe was then the technological leader, and
technology diﬀerences in 1500 are an increasing function of genetic distance relative to the English.19
For both 1500 and 1870, the standardized beta on genetic distance is around 15 − 17%,s m a l l e r
than in 2005 but still a substantial portion of the variation, particularly considering the likely
prevalence of error in the measurement of the dependent variable, which raises the standard error
of the regression.
4.3 Contemporary Technological Diﬀerences
While aggregate TFP is interesting to ﬁx ideas, this paper is mainly about the spread of speciﬁc
technologies, so for the remainder of this paper we focus on data at the level of disaggregated
19While we use distance from the English to deﬁne relative frontier distance in these regressions, picking instead any
of the Western European populations in our sample - Italian, German or Danish - would yield similar results.Genetic
distances among these populations are very small relative to the World variation.
20technologies. We start with the CEG data. Tables 3 and 4 present estimates of equations (32)
and (33), respectively, for all CEG sectoral measures of technology usage lags for the year 2000.
Entered alone (Table 3), genetic distance relative to the United States is positively related with
technological diﬀerences for all measures, and statistically signiﬁcantly at the 5% level for 3 of the
4 sectoral measures, as well as the absolute diﬀerence in the overall technology usage lag index.
The only sectoral category for which genetic distance is not signiﬁcant is agricultural technology,
which is perhaps more mature in 2000 and has diﬀused more broadly (since the 1960s many de-
veloping countries with strong comparative advantages in agriculture have widely adopted modern
agricultural technologies). For communications, transportation and industrial technologies, the
standardized eﬀect of relative frontier distance ranges anywhere from 1273% to 2597%,a n df o r
the overall technology index it equals 1981%, roughly in line with the results for aggregate TFP.
T u r n i n gt oT a b l e4 ,w h i c hc o n d u c t sah o r s e r a c eb e tween bilateral and relative frontier distance,
we ﬁnd that the latter trumps the former: when entered together in the regressions, relative frontier
distance comes out signiﬁcantly positive, while bilateral distance comes in either insigniﬁcant or even
negative. The standardized magnitude of the eﬀect of relative frontier distance across technological
categories remains in line with those in Table 3, and the inclusion of bilateral genetic distance
barely aﬀects the regression R-squared. In sum, relative frontier distance carries virtually all of the
explanatory power. This is perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of the main testable hypothesis
in our model - namely the hypothesis that genealogical distance introduces signiﬁcant barriers to
the spread of innovations.
4.4 1500 Technological Diﬀerences
While the results for 2000 capture the intensive margin of technological adoption, the data for 1500
capture exclusively the extensive margin, and as such provide an alternative test of the hypothesis
that genetic distance hinders the diﬀusion of innovations. Tables 5 and 6 show results using the CEG
data for 1500 to construct the dependent variables - the diﬀerence in technology adoption indices
at the sectoral and overall levels. The results here are even stronger than for the contemporary
period in terms of the magnitude of the estimated barrier eﬀects of genealogical relatedness. For
every measure of bilateral technology diﬀerence, genetic distance relative to the UK enters with a
positive sign, is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% l e v e li na l lc a s e s ,a n da tt h e1% level in 5 of the
6 cases. The weakest results, again, are for agriculture, and the strongest for transportation and
military technologies. The magnitude of the eﬀects, in terms of standardized betas, range from
211041% (agricultural technologies) to 4181% (transportation technologies), while the eﬀect on the
overall technological diﬀerence index is 3163%. Thus, a standard deviation in genetic distance
relative to the UK can account for about one third of a typical diﬀerence in technology adoption
between countries.
Turning to the more direct test of our theory, namely the horserace with bilateral genetic
distance, we ﬁnd again in Table 6 that in all cases (save agricultural technologies) relative frontier
distance trumps bilateral genetic distance in terms of magnitude, sign and/or statistical signiﬁcance.
Moreover, the magnitude of the eﬀect of relative frontier distance barely changes compared to Table
5, so that the inclusion of bilateral geneticd i s t a n c ei nt h er e g r e s s i o nh a sb e n i g ne ﬀect. To conclude,
the strong evidence we uncovered in the contemporary period holds also for the pre-Industrial era.
This was also the era prior to the vast migrations that followed the discovery of the New World, so
one cannot argue that they reﬂect the endogeneity of genetic distance with respect to technological
attractiveness.20
4.5 Results for Disaggregated Technologies
Our ﬁnal test is to turn to even more disaggregated technologies, from the CHAT dataset. While
the data from CEG provides useful sectoral characterizations of the technological achievements of
nations throughout history, the sectoral indices are aggregated and do not allow us to determine
which of the underlying technologies drive the results. The CHAT dataset allows us to address this
shortcoming because it provides data on technology use for a wide range of speciﬁc technologies.
As already mentioned, we use data on 33 technologies for which we observe data for more than 50
countries, and deﬁne our dependent variables, for each technology, as the absolute diﬀerence in the
per capita use of the technology. For instance, for cell phone technology, our dependent variable is
the absolute diﬀerence, between country  and country , in the number of cell phones per capita.
To maintain consistency, we assume that the technological leader for all these technologies was the
US (this turns out to be the case in actuality in the vast share of the cases, and in the instances
when it is not the case the leader is usually a country that is genetically very close to the US, such
as a Northwestern European country).
The results are presented in Table 7. In every single case,t h ee ﬀect of relative frontier distance is
20We believe this argument is hard to make for the contemporary era as well as it is diﬃcult to argue that the
reason, say, that Europeans migrated to North America was because of superior technological potential there ex ante.
22positive. Additionally, in 22 of the 33 cases, the eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at least at the 10% level (in 19 of these the signiﬁcance obtains at the 5% level). Here, the results
are particularly strong for some agricultural technologies, for most communications technologies,
and for all but one of the industrial technologies. The results are weakest for medical technologies
and transportation. Turning to the magnitude of the eﬀects, for the technologies where relative
frontier distance is statistically signiﬁcant, the standardized betas vary between about 8% and 24%
- slightly smaller than for the CEG data but in the same rough order of magnitude.
For the sake of space we do not report the results of the horserace regressions which add
bilateral genetic distance to the speciﬁcation of Table 7 in order to test which of relative frontier
distance or bilateral genetic distance are better predictors of technology diﬀerences. The overall
lesson from these horseraces is that relative frontier distance comes out more signiﬁcant in 17 of
the 22 cases where relative distance was previously signiﬁcant, and in most of these cases bilateral
genetic distance either is insigniﬁcant or even bears a negative sign. Thus, the preponderance of
the evidence at the level of disaggregated technologies is consistent with our barriers model.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The history of human populations is characterized by successive splits which led populations to
stray apart and develop speciﬁc cultural and biological traits over the course of time. The longer
two populations have been separated, the more their vertically transmitted traits can be expected
to diﬀer. The central hypothesis in this paper is that diﬀerences in vertically transmitted traits
between populations hinders the exchange of ideas, and hence the diﬀusion of innovations. Using
genetic distance as a summary measure of diﬀerences in vertically transmitted human traits, we
showed that, indeed, populations that are genetically far from the innovator display lower aggregate
TFP, higher technology usage lags, lower uptake on the extensive margin of technology adoption,
and overall lower rates of technology usage at the level of disaggregated technologies. These results
are quantitatively strong and statistically signiﬁcant in the vast majority of cases, and hold both
in the contemporary period and historically, going as far back as 1500.
While this paper has provided clear evidence of a barrier eﬀect of genetic distance, much work
remains to be done to elucidate the precise mechanisms whereby diﬀerences in human traits hinder
the diﬀusion of innovations. We have presented reduced form, descriptive patterns linking genetic
distance and technology use, as well as a formal test of our barriers model based on comparing the
23eﬀect of bilateral genetic distance versus relative frontier distance. However, we have not answered
the question of why populations that are genetically distant from the innovator tend not to adopt
frontier technologies. Is it for lack of trust or understanding across diﬀerent populations? Is it
because communication is diﬃcult? Is it because adapting innovations developed for a diﬀerent
cultural context is hindered by diﬀerences in norms, habits or customs? We leave these important
questions for future research.
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26Appendix 1 - Technologies used in the various datasets
A. 24 Technologies in the CEG 1500 AD Dataset.
1. Military: Standing army, cavalry, ﬁrearms, muskets, ﬁeld artillery, warfare capable ships, heavy
naval guns, ships (+180 guns).
2. Agriculture: Hunting and gathering, pastoralism, hand cultivation, plough cultivation.
3. Transportation : Ships capable of crossing the Atlantic Ocean, ships capable of crossing the
Paciﬁc Ocean, ships capable of reaching the Indian Ocean, wheel, magnetic compass, horse powered
vehicles.
4. Communications: Movable block printing, woodblock or block printing, books, paper.
5. Industry: Steel, iron.
B. 10 Technologies in the CEG 2000 AD Dataset.
Electricity (in 1990), Internet (in 1996), PCs (in 2002), cell phones (in 2002), telephones (in 1970),
cargo and passenger aviation (in 1990), trucks (in 1990), cars (in 1990), tractors (in 1970).
C. 33 Technologies in the CHAT dataset for 1990-1999.
1. Agriculture: Harvest machines, tractors used in agriculture, metric tons of fertilizer consumed,
area of irrigated crops, share of cropland area planted with modern varieties (% cropland), metric
tons of pesticides.
2. Transportation: civil aviation passenger km, lengths of rail line, tons of freight carried on
railways, passenger cars in use and commercial vehicles in use.
3. Medical: Hospital beds, DPT immunization before age 1, measles immunization before age 1.
4. Communications: Cable TV, cell phones, personal computers, access to the Internet, items
mailed/received, newspaper circulation, radios, telegrams sent, mainline telephone lines, television
sets in use.
5. Industry and other: Output of electricity, KwHr, automatic looms, total looms, crude steel
production in electric arc furnaces, weight of artiﬁcial (cellulosic) ﬁbers used in spindles, weight
of synthetic (non cellulosic) ﬁbers used in spindles, weight of all types of ﬁbers used in spindles,












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1 - Genetic distance among 42 populations.  
Source: Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994. 
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